Alternative Insight
Putin to the Rescue?
One of the Cold War legacies emerged from the Soviet Union discarding its involvement in the Middle East, which left the United States to establish hegemony and suffer the resulting problems alone - casualties, embarrassment, deception and animosities. After inheriting a Middle East brought to total catastrophe and instability due to the efforts of previous administrations, and accentuated by the emergence of ISIS, the Obama administration is stepping carefully, unwilling to commit itself too strongly. Noting the near vacuum, Russia has increased its presence in the troubled region with a force that is much less potent than media descriptions.
Rumor and fabrication that fit agendas and cater to audiences depict the Russian mission as the start of a huge commitment of supplying troops to assist the Assad regime. This may become true in the future, but facts and logic in the incipient stage do not support this thesis. Although Russia has economic attachments to the region, with military and energy sales in Egypt, Algeria and Iran, the benefits of this trade does not depend upon the outcome of the war in Syria. Trade and investments in Syria will fold but that has already happened and there is little hope they can return. The overriding considerations are:
(1) Russia has not fought outside of its close borders and any casualties occurring from an external adventure is certain to severely reduce Putin's popularity.
(2) Despite a strong attachment between the regimes, an Assad fall does not affect Russia's confined power to any great extent.Unless Putin is irrational and illogical, Russia's commitment to the war in Syria will be limited to providing weapons for defense and morale for sustenance. Air strikes, which are not risky for Russian pilots, may also occur. Regard the situation.
With its mechanized ground forces and adequate air force, Assad's military has not been able to dislodge adversaries that have few mechanized weapons, and his government has consistently lost ground. Comparison to the previous war in Libya explains this anomaly.
In Libya, Gaddafi's mechanized air and land forces effectively won the battle against the rebels until NATO neutralized his military. Because the rebels did not have much active support from the population, Gaddafi, who had adequate support, was able to push the rebels back and exert control until NATO cleared the air and ground of the regimes planes and tanks.
In Syria, even if Assad's forces defeat ISIS in battle, the government does not have sufficient support from the population to maintain control. In most of the captured territory, either those loyal to the regime have fled or the remaining citizens are passive to ISIS and in opposition to the government. The refugee crisis reinforces that argument; many of those who enter Europe have said with their swollen feet that they have no expectations of returning home. In addition, U.S. efforts in training a 5000 free Syrian army have resulted in the trainees deserting to ISIS with the equipment. With only nine trained fighters found to be reliable, who is there among the Syrian population to counter the terrorist organizations? More offensive weapons can cause deaths to ISIS fighters but cannot give life to a Syrian government administration in already lost territory. For this reason, Putin's objectives are limited:
(1) Noting its own problems with the self proclaimed Caucasus Emirates, which has sworn allegiance to ISIS and contributed several thousand fighters to the ISIS campaign, Russia wants to keep ISIS under attack
(2) By demonstrating that Russia stands by friends and by preserving allies in a Northern portion of the Middle East, which stretches from Hezbollah in Lebanon, through Assad in Syria, to Iraq and to Iran, Russia satisfies an immediate strategic interest of supporting those who are willing to fight ISIS.
(3) Diminishing U.S. hegemony promotes Russian hegemony.
(4) Russia maintains a fleet in the Mediterranean Sea that needs bases for maintenance and supply. Although the naval base at Tartus is not a huge complex and rumors have circulated of it being abandoned, it makes sense for Russia to maintain and defend the base.Does the Russian president know what others will not admit, that both Syria and Iraq are already split and ISIS, despite its miniscule following, has been able to institute control?
Syria now has four major divisions, ISIS in the east, rebels that include al-Qaeda's Jabhat al-Nusra Front in the northwest, Kurdish territory in a sliver of the north and the Assad government in the southwest and along the northern coast above Lebanon. Arrangements have even being made to transfer territory and populations. The New York Times, September 25, 2015 reports
In one of the most ambitious deals yet struck between combatants in the multisided war in Syria, supporters and opponents of President Bashar al-Assad will essentially trade territory in two different parts of the country, stop bombing and besieging one another's civilians and pledge to observe a six-month cease-fire.
If the deal holds, it will be the most far-reaching since a pact struck more than a year ago that allowed the evacuation of rebel fighters from the center of Homs, Syria's third-largest city.
The deal would end attacks by the government and its allies on Zabadani, a city between Damascus, the capital, and the Lebanese border that has long been held by local insurgents, as well as attacks by rebels on the Shiite villages of Foua and Kefraya in Idlib Province.
But it involves a sectarian population exchange, sending the Shiites in Idlib to other government-held areas, and moving Zabadani's Sunni rebels and their families to insurgent-held Idlib, raising the specter of forced demographic change.By receiving mechanized and lethal Russian equipment, Assad's forces will be able to protect the territory they now control, but it is doubtful they will be able to recover what has been lost. Areas outside of government control may have ISIS, al Nusra and the Kurds engaging one another in order to extend their respective influences.
Iraq is even more settled into divisions. The Sunni population in central Iraq has not rallied against ISIS, and it is assumed they have given ISIS a margin of acceptance. The Kurds operate independently of the central government and the Shi'a led government shows much concern about oil revenues and little concern about the health and welfare of the other regions. ISIS remains unchallenged in Mosul, Kurds operate Kirkuk and the government holds on to Baghdad. Each group is eager to extend its authority but each remains cautious in mounting large scale offensive actions.
It is beginning to look like ISIS can only defeat itself, which may eventually happen. Relatively small minorities have been able to control large majorities; Taliban in Afghanistan, communists in the Soviet Union, Gaddafi in Libya, Tutsis in Rwanda, Sunnis in Bahrain, as examples. Antagonism grows, and the major forces may eventually consolidate and be able to confront the minority force that controls them. As of October 2015, that is the major hope for liberation from ISIS in Syria and Iraq. From that perspective, Russia's intentions seem to be only to halt advancements by rebel groups, including ISIS, in Syria. Although ISIS partners will erupt in other regions -- Afghanistan, Caucus, Africa -- the October 2015 maps of Syria and Iraq may describe the extent of the ISIS caliphate in the Middle East. Arab nations bordering on Iraq and Syria have sufficient resources to repulse ISIS.
Lebanon's confessional arrangement has a population that mostly rejects ISIS and a Lebanese army and Hezbollah militia that will defend Lebanon.
Jordan, with a minimal ISIS content and an almost Palestinian majority, will also be able to defend against ISIS.
Kuwait has the U.S. fleet to defend it.
Saudi Arabia is too well fortified and controlled for ISIS to make much of an organized presence.
Media presentations of Russia and Assad's role in the Syrian rebellion distort the reality. Peripatetic media appearances by former Ambassador to Russia, Michael McFaul (December 2011-February 2014) peddles the theme that "if there were no Assad, there would be no ISIS."
Assad may be responsible for several atrocities against his people and for the local fighters that comprise a Free Syrian army but he is not responsible for the invasion of foreign fighters who comprise the major rebel forces. These insults to humanity are the product of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Emirates' earlier financial and military support to the foreign fighters and Turkey's permitting their passage to Syria. U.S. "friends" are responsible for ISIS in Syria and attempts to shift the blame delude the public and deter a solution.
Nor can ISIS in Iraq, the center of the Caliphate, by any stretch of reporting be due to Assad intransigence. Clearly, the George W. Bush administration and its neocon cohorts who engineered the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime and invasion of Iraq are responsible for the emergence of al-Qaeda in Iraq. Bush's choice and support of Nouri al-Maliki as Iraq's incompetent president enraged the Iraq Sunni population and moved it to eventually give support to ISIS for conquering Mosul and establishing the caliphate.
The constant attacks on Russia and its Middle East allies obfuscate the essential issue - ISIS is the major enemy of the west and the first step in defeating ISIS is the selection of the lesser of two evils.
Despite the media's constant "made for public" exaggerations, Hezbollah, Syria, Iraq and Iran have not directly contributed to international terrorism or the establishment of ISIS. Due to their Shi'a majoritist regimes, in which the Shi'a majorities rule over the Sunni and other minorities, Iraq and Iran have indirectly inflamed Sunni elements into assisting the formation of a Sunni Nation. However, the Shi'a majoritist regimes are much less punishing than the majoritist regimes in Saudi Arabia and Israel, where singular religious identifications rule over minorities.
Saudi Arabia's majority has not only terrified Shi's populations but directly contributed to the formation of international terrorism and directly harmed other populations within the Saudi nation, in Bahrain and in Yemen. Israel has directly oppressed the Palestinian people, warred against Muslim nations and fomented antagonisms against the western world.
Which summarizes the entire argument.
U.S. friends have caused terrorism and the rise of ISIS.
U.S. selected enemies have been prominent and suffered in the battles against al-Qaeda and ISIS.
Choosing the lesser of two evils is not unique. Don't American voters do that in each of their national elections?alternativeinsight
october 2015HOME PAGE MAIN PAGE 
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